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Abstract
In this work, we study the problem of privacy preserving computation
on PageRank algorithm. The idea is to enforce the secure multi party
computation of the algorithm iteratively using homomorphic encryption
based on Paillier scheme. In the proposed PageRank computation, a user
encrypt its own graph data using asymmetric encryption method, sends
the data set into different parties in a privacy-preserving manner. Each
party computes its own encrypted entity, but learns nothing about the
data at other parties.
1 Introduction
In this work, we investigate the problem with two or more parties wish to
compute the PageRank algorithm [1] on an encrypted graph data set. In this
computation model a user doesn’t want to disclose private graph data and want
to compute compute intensive large scale graph data set.
Graph data sets often contain some private feature information about per-
sonal identifying information and also their sensitive relationships [2, 3, 4]. The
disclosure risk of the sensitive data arise with the outsourced computation such
cloud computing based computation model. Secure multi party computation
based privacy preserving techniques are usually adopted to privacy through se-
cret sharing and homomorphic encryption scheme for the original graph data.
In this paper, we investigate how to perform the PageRank computation
over the encrypted graph data. The main contributions are
• The work protects the all structure of a graph data without losing the
capability to perform PageRank algorithm over it.
• The proposed method is secure in the semi-honest model. Assuming that
all parties correctly follow the protocol.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the privacy,
secure multi-party computation and semi-honest security model. Section 3 intro-
duces homomorphic encryption, floating point numbers problem and arbitrarily
partitioned data. Section 5 presents our method to compute the PageRank
values on the encrypted synthetic graph data. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Privacy definition
To decide whether a solution achieves the privacy requirements, we need to know
the formal definition of privacy. We use a simplified form of the standard defini-
tion of security in the static, semi-honest model due to Goldreich [5]. Our other
assumption is that all parties follow the protocol which is called semi-honest
security model [6, 7]. A formal definition of private two-party computation in
the semi-honest model is given below.
Definition 1. (privacy w.r.t. semi-honest behavior): Let f : {0, 1}∗×{0, 1}∗ 7→
{0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ be probabilistic polynomial-time functionality, where f1(x, y)
(respectively f2(x, y)) denotes first (resp., second) element of f(x, y); and let Π
be two-party protocol for computing f . The view of the first (resp., second) party
during an execution of Π, denoted viewΠ1 (resp., view
Π
2 ), be (x, r1,m1, · · · ,mt)
(resp., (y, r2,m1, · · · ,mt)). r1 denotes the outcome of the first (resp., r2 second)
party’s internal coin tosses, and mi denotes the i
th message it has received.
The output of the first (resp., second) party during an execution of Π on
(x, y), denoted OUTPUTΠ1 (x, y) (resp., OUTPUT
Π
2 (x, y)) is implicit in party’s
view of the execution.
We say that Π privately computes f , if there exists polynomial-time algo-
rithms, denoted S1 and S2, such that
{(S1(x, f1(x, y)), f2(x, y)}x,y∈{0,1}∗ c≡ {V IEWΠ1 (x, y)}x,y∈{0,1}∗
{(S2(x, f1(x, y)), f2(x, y)}x,y∈{0,1}∗ c≡ {V IEWΠ2 (x, y)}x,y∈{0,1}∗
In this section formal definition of privacy is given in the graph data set
that can model a variety of security protocols and attacks. The proposed model
involves a graph G(V,E), a set of k parties P1, · · · , Pk. Given a matrix D, let
|D| denotes the number of rows in D.
We continue with the definitions for security in the semi-honest model. In
semi-honest security model, Assuming that a party correctly follow the protocols
using its correct input.
3 Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly introduce preliminary knowledge of homomorphic
encryption, floating point numbers and arbitrarily partitioned data.
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3.1 Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption enables operations on plaintexts to be performed on
their respective ciphertexts without disclosing the plaintexts when data is di-
vided between two or more servers as it facilitates computations with cipher-
texts. A public-key encryption scheme is additively homomorphic if, given two
encrypted messages Enc(a) and Enc(b), there exists a public-key operation ⊕
such that Enc(a)⊕Enc(b) is an encryption of a+ b. Formally, a cryptosystem
is additively homomorphic if for any secret key, public key (sk, pk) the plaintext
space P = ZN for x, y ∈ ZN .
Epk(x + y mod N) = Epk(x).Epk(y)
Epk(x · y mod N) = Epk(x)y
(1)
3.1.1 Paillier’s Encryption Scheme
Paillier cryptosystem [8] is a probabilistic asymmetric algorithm based on the
problem to decide whether a number is an nth residue modulo n2 [9]. The
problem of computing nth residue classes is believed to be computationally
hard where n is the product of two large primes.
Given a set of possible plaintexts M , a set of key pairs K = PK×SK where
PK is the public key, SK is the secret key. Paillier homomorphic encryption
cryptosystem satisfies the following property of any two plaintexts m1 and m2
and a constant value a.
Dsk (Epk (m1)× Epk (m1)) = m1 + m2 (2)
Dsk (Epk (m1)
a
) = a×m1 (3)
Definition 1. If the adjacency matrix A(G) of a graph G has no loops, then
all entries on the main diagonal of A(G) are zeros. Hence aij = 0 whenever
i = j∀i, j.
The adjacency matrix A(G) of a graph G is sparse and often binary. In
order to prevent guessing elements of input data set, Paillier cryptosystem has
probabilistic encryption that does not encrypt two equal plain text with the
same encryption key into the same ciphertext.
3.2 Floating Point Numbers
Although the proposed protocol manipulate integers, the PageRank algorithm
is typically applied to continuous data. However, in the case of real number
inputs to the protocol, we need to map data vectors into the discrete domain
[10].
Let ConvertInteger : Rm → Zm be the corresponding function that multi-
plies its argument by an exponent (K : 2K) then rounds them to the nearest
3
integer value and thus support finite precision. Equation 4 shows the conversion
function.
xˆ← ConvertInteger(x) where x ∈ Rm, xˆ ∈ Zm (4)
3.3 Arbitrarily Partitioned Data
In this work, arbitrary partitioned data between multi-parties (K), K > 2 is
considered. In the arbitrary partitioned data scheme, there is no specific order
of how the data is divided between multiple parties. Specifically, if we have a
data set X = {x1, · · ·xn}, consisting of n row, and each rows in X contains
m numeric attributes xi = {x1i · · ·xmi }. Xji is the subset of data set owned by
party Pj , then we have X
1
i ∪X2i · · · ∪XKi = Xi and X1i ∩X2i · · · ∩XKi = ∅. In
each row (Xi), party Pk has a number of attributes t
k
i , where
∑K
p=1 t
k
i = m and
each party’s attribute size does not have to be equal. If a party has the same
attributes in each row, then the arbitrary partition becomes a vertical partition.
4 Privacy-Preserving PageRank
We now formally define the problem. Let k be the number of parties, each
having different attributes for the same set of entities (i.e. adjacency matrix
rows). Parties P1, · · · , Pk have as their respective private input sets (i.e., adja-
cency matrix) S1, · · · , Sk drawn from some finite universe U . The parties try
to measure the importance of nodes with their joint data using the PageRank
algorithm in a privacy-preserving manner, i.e., without leaking their elements
of S.
4.1 Notation
A directed graph G(V, E ,m) representing a web sites set is a set on n nodes
connected by a set of m links, where V denotes the set of nodes and E ⊆ V × V
is the set of links and m : V → (0,∞) is a weight. For a node u ∈ V, N denotes
the number of hyperlinks contained in page (node) u.
Given s1, s2 ∈ V, one can say that x and y are neighbors (i.e. hyperlinked
from x to y ) if E(x, y) > 0 [11].
4.2 Security model
In this paper, the aim is to enable multiple parties (or servers) to jointly conduct
the PageRank computation without revealing their private data. Our main
assumption is that the input data set is divided between two or more parties,
that are willing to compute the PageRank of G if nothing beyond the expected
end results are revealed [12]. Our other assumption is that all parties follow the
protocol which is called semi-honest security model [6, 7].
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4.3 Graph Representation
In order to protect the unauthorized access to the sensitive graph information,
one needs to represent and encrypt the graph in a proper way. In order to
achieve these requirements, adjacency matrix representation is used. let k be
the number of parties, each has the same attributes for the different entities.
The distributed parties try to calculate PageRank algorithm by using their joint
data (i.e., adjacency matrix).
The PageRank algorithm needs adjacency matrix A of graph G(V, E). The
proposed protocols directly follow the standard the PageRank algorithm. The
approximations to the page rank values are iteratively computed until the
changes in values in one iteration is below a threshold or max iteration number
is reached. At each iteration, each party multiplies its own encrypted adjacency
matrix JAKi with PageRank and out degree vectors as shown in Equation 5.
JT Ki =
 JaK1,1 · · · JaK1,j... . . . ...JaKm,1 · · · JaKm,j

Pr1...
Prm


1
d1
...
1
dm
 (5)
where JaK is the encrypted elements of JAK, Pr is the PageRank values of graph
G and d is the out degree values. Once the JT Ki are computed at each party,
then another trusted party merges the matrices to find a global encrypted JT K
matrix as shown in Equation 6.
JT K = k⋃
i=1
JT Ki (6)
The trusted party decrypts JT K using private key keypriv, calculates the
PageRank values as shown in Equation 7.
Pr(Vi) = 1− dN + d
∑
pj∈M(pi)
Pr(Vj)
L(Vj) (7)
At each iteration, the PageRank is calculated, i.e., the proposed protocols
securely find the PageRank vector for graph G. Once the initial PageRank values
are known, the next Pagerank values can be computed locally. Protocol 1 use
Protocol 2 (secureIntMatrix ) to compute secure intermediate matrix.
The proposed algorithm is shown in Protocol 1 - 2.
5 Experiments
We evaluated the proposed algorithm on a synthetic graph data set with 20
nodes. We implemented the protocols in Python 2.7 with the Paillier 1 library.
The experiments were performed on a computer with a 2.6 GHz Intel Core
1https://github.com/mikeivanov/paillier
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Input: Adjacency matrix: A ∈ Rm×m party size: k, Crypto key length:
l, damping factor d,
Result: Encrypted sub data sets for each party Ps
begin
D ←− normalize(D);
Keypub,Keypriv ←− KeyGen(l) . Generate public/private keys ;
for i ∈ k do
// create sub adjacency matrix Ai with random feature index for party Pi ;JAiK←− encrypt(Ai,Keypub);
sendToParty(JAKi,Keypub);
end
repeat
foreach Ps ∈ P do
call secureIntMatrix( JAKs) {Protocol 2} . for each party;
end
comp mat← ⋃ki=1 decrypt(JT Ki, keypriv) . Decrypt, merge;
for i = 1 · · ·m do
PageRank[i]← 1−dN + d
∑m
j=1 comp mat[j, i]
end
until Pagerank converges;
end
Protocol 1: Adjacency matrix split and encryption
i5 processor and 4 GB main memory running Mac OSX. The execution time is
measured by used processor time in seconds with different node size and different
encryption key length. Experimental results are shwon in Table 1.
6 Conclusion and Future Works
We introduce a new homomorphic encryption based privacy-preserving PageR-
ank algorithm with secure multi-party computation approach. We showed the
effects of different encryption key length on results with graphics. In particular,
different party size and key length could also be investigated for both in compu-
tation time and computation error because of scaling problem of the encryption
method.
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